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February, 2001The Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), established in 1993, is a civil society initiative to promote 
an ongoing dialogue between the principal partners in the decision-making and implementing 
process. The dialogues are designed to address important policy issues and to seek constructive 
solutions to these problems. The Centre has already organised a series of such dialogues at local, 
regional and national levels. The CPD has also organised a number of South Asian bilateral and 
regional dialogues as well as some international dialogues.  These dialogues have brought together 
ministers, opposition frontbenchers, MPs, business leaders, NGOs, donors, professionals and other 
functional groups in civil society within a non-confrontational environment to promote focused 
discussions. The expectation of the CPD is to create a national policy consciousness where members 
of civil society will be made aware of critical policy issues affecting their lives and will come 
together in support of particular policy agendas which they feel are conducive to the well being of 
the country.  
 
In support of the dialogue process the Centre is engaged in research programmes which are both 
serviced by and are intended to serve as inputs for particular dialogues organised by the Centre 
throughout the year.  Some of the major research programmes of CPD include The Independent 
Review of Bangladesh's Development (IRBD), Governance and Development, Population and 
Sustainable Development, Trade Policy Analysis and Multilateral Trading System, Corporate 
Responsibility, Governance, Regional Cooperation for Infrastructure Development and 
Leadership Programme  for the Youth. The CPD also carries out periodic public perception surveys 
on policy issues and developmental concerns. 
 
Dissemination of information and knowledge on critical development issues continues to remain an 
important component of CPD’s activities. Pursuant to this CPD maintains an active publication 
programme, both in Bangla and in English. As part of its dissemination programme, CPD has 
decided to bring out CPD Occasional Paper Series on a regular basis. Dialogue background papers, 
investigative reports and results of perception surveys which relate to issues of high public interest 
will be published  under its cover. The Occasional Paper Series will also include draft research 
papers and reports  which may be subsequently published by the CPD.  
 
The present paper, The Ongoing WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Issues and Options for 
Bangladesh, has been prepared under the CPD programme on Trade Policy Analysis and 
Multilateral Trading System. This programme aims at strengthening institutional capacity in 
Bangladesh in the area of trade policy analysis, negotiations and implementation. The 
programme, inter alia, seeks  to project the civil society’s  perspectives on the emerging issues 
emanating from the process of globalisation and liberalisation. The outputs of the programme will 
be available to all stakeholder groups including the government and policymakers, entrepreneurs 
and business leaders, and trade and development partners. 
 
The programme has received support from the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA) and is being implemented in collaboration with the Centre for Trade Policy and Law 
(CTPL), Otttawa,Canada. 
 
The present paper, The Ongoing WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Issues and Options for 
Bangladesh, was presented at the CPD in- house dialogue on the theme of WTO and 
Negotiation on Agriculture held at CPD Dialogue Room , Dhaka on November 29, 2001.  The 
author of the paper is Donald McClatchy, Associate of the CTPL, University of Carleton, 
Ottawa ,Canada. 
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The Ongoing WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: 





This paper is exploratory and suggestive.  To a large extent arguments are developed 
from the point of view of a ‘generic’ developing country (DC)
1.  Where possible, the 
interests of Bangladesh in particular are identified, but it is hoped that the paper will 
stimulate a discussion in which these can be much more thoroughly fleshed out --- in turn 
assisting those responsible for decisions about Bangladesh’s evolving negotiating 
positions and strategy. 
 
The paper begins with a discussion of some general points of background relevance.  It is 
assumed that the reader is already broadly familiar with the content of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture, including its structuring of disciplines in the three 
main areas of “market access”, “export competition” and “domestic support”
2. 
 
It then provides a point-by-point review of the main negotiation agenda items in each of 
the three structural areas established in the Uruguay Round, plus some which fall outside 
the existing structure. 
 
In Section 4., options for rules, for modalities and for “special and differential treatment” 
(S&DT) provisions which would address the concerns of developing countries are 
discussed.  These options include ‘old’ provisions, already introduced in the Uruguay 
Round, and potential ‘new’ provisions.   
 
By way of summary, a skeleton negotiating strategy is then put forward for consideration, 




2.1       NEW FOCUS ON CONCERNS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (DCs)  
 
Although the name has not been formally adopted, the new Doha Work Program is, in 
effect, the “Development Round”
3.  The breakdown in Seattle helped developed 
countries (DMEs for developed market economies) recognize that, in fact, developing 
countries (DCs) received relatively few benefits from the Uruguay Round, and that this 
situation must be redressed. 
 
There are many more WTO member countries now and DCs form a clear majority.  This 
means the negotiating dynamic must change.  Officially, decisions are still made by 
consensus; in practice, the influence of each individual country varies—probably 
depending largely on the value of its trade and rather little on the size of its population. 
WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Issues and Options for Bangladesh  1
                                                           
1 It should be recalled that, as a “least developed country” (LDC), Bangladesh is also a “developing 
country” (DC).  In other words, LDCs are a subset of DCs.  Thus, Bangladesh will automatically benefit 
from any “special and differential” (S&D) provisions made for DCs.  Where further (even more 
favourable) S&D provisions are made for LDCs (which will not also be the case), then these will be the 
operative provisions in Bangladesh’s case.  
2 Readers unfamiliar with the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture are referred to a summary of this 
Agreement prepared by the WTO Secretariat available on the WTO website and annexed to this paper. 
3 See WTO (2001(a)). 
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2.2    MINIMAL  BANGLADESH  PARTICIPATION  TO  DATE  IN     
AGRICULTURE     NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Like many developing country members at this point, Bangladesh has had no official 
involvement with any of the formal negotiating papers (G/AG/NG/W series) tabled 
during Phase 1 of the negotiations (up to March 2001).  Nor has it been associated with 
any of the “non-papers” tabled during Phase 2 (April – Sept. 2001).  The advantage of 
this situation is that Bangladesh’s hands are untied by previous commitments; all possible 
options can still be considered. 
 
The recent speech of the Commerce Minister Amir Khasru Mahmood Chowdhury at 
Doha puts the general Bangladesh position on the record, but indicates nothing very 
specific in the agricultural area. 
 
2.3    BANGLADESH’S  TRADE  WITH  NEIGHBOURING  COUNTRIES  IS       
RELATIVELY SMALL  
 
In 1999, about 3 percent of Bangladesh’s total exports were to other countries in the 
South Asia (SAARC) region, and about 18 percent of total imports came from within the 
region.
4  These figures may be somewhat higher for agricultural products, particularly if 
unrecorded trade was taken into account.  
 
Being effectively part of a larger continental market can have advantages of less year-to-
year variability in prices (particularly for less-storable fruit and vegetable commodities 
subject to weather-related production fluctuations—e.g., potatoes).  Of course this 
implies the development of an appropriate transportation and marketing structure as well 
as the mutual removal of trade restrictions.  But it is one of the reasons why regional 
trade agreements (which go beyond the WTO) have proliferated in recent years (e.g., 
NAFTA, MERCOSUR, etc) 
 
A country’s WTO negotiating strategy needs to take into account its existing 
commitments and future plans under regional trade agreements.  Bangladesh participates 
in two regional trade agreements
5 and has bilateral agreements (nearly all trade-oriented) 
with 31 countries.  Its commitments under these in agriculture appear to be quite limited, 
at this point . 
 
2.4    IMPLICATIONS  OF  A  MORE LIBERAL TRADE REGIME:     
DIVERSIFICATION, NON-TRADE CONCERNS, FOOD SECURITY, ETC. 
 
As a member of the WTO, Bangladesh is already committed to the principle of free trade. 
Freer trade generates more trade, and in both directions.   It also means more 
specialization  of production in those products for which the country’s resource 
endowment gives it a comparative advantage.  Thus, on theoretical grounds, freer trade 
can at first sight appear to be directly at odds with a country’s goal of agricultural 
diversification. However, one can also find many examples where it is the distortions 
caused by existing trade restrictions—either of the same country or of its trading 
partners—which have caused a rather narrow existing production base.  The disincentive 
                                                           
4 Samaratunga (1999), cited by Athukorala (1999, Table 10). 
5 The South Asia Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) with the 6 other SAARC countries, and the 
Bangkok Agreement, under which some tariff concessions are extended to Korea, Sri Lanka & India 
(WTO, 2000) 
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to further agricultural processing in DCs caused by tariff escalation in DMEs is one 
glaring example of this. 
 
In practice, the increased two-way trade induced by Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
between countries, where these have been implemented, has often involved increased 
two-way trade in the same product, with the specialization being manifested in the type 
of product, and without the industry in either country being wiped out (Canadian wine 
example under the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement - CUSFTA).  Furthermore, the 
opening of foreign markets can potentially give Bangladeshi producers access to an 
effective demand for a wider variety of products than domestic consumers seek, e.g., for 
reasons of culture or income.  So it is not clear a priori that freer trade is generally 
incompatible with agricultural diversification, though some types of previously protected 
primary production may well be harmed by it. 
 
Another important point is that increased two-way trade blurs the distinction between net 
food (or agricultural) importers and net exporters.  As many countries progress to being 
both significant gross exporters and significant gross importers, their overall net position 
matters much less.  Of course some countries, like Japan, will always be predominantly 
agricultural importers, but in Bangladesh’s case, with the resources it has, this may be 
less clear. At least it is fallacious to argue that, because it is now a net food importer, 
Bangladesh benefits from lower world prices and therefore should support the retention 
of distorting agricultural subsidies by the rich countries.  This would be a recipe for 
depressing domestic production (which would cause the import bill to be higher) and for 
increasing domestic market instability. 
 
Concepts like “non-trade concerns” and “food security” tend to mean different things to 
different countries, and must be defined more precisely in order to be meaningfully 
addressed in a new agreement.  Many DCs are now suspicious of, and reluctant to 
support, the concept of “non-trade concerns”, seeing it as a possible cover for unlimited 
farm support spending by some rich countries.   
 
“Food security” tends to have several dimensions.  For some countries the important 
element is a minimum degree of ‘food self-sufficiency’.  This may suggest the need for 
tariff protection, and/or the freedom to provide production incentives through 
government programs, but can hardly be seen to be consistent with the goal of free trade.  
There is also a problem of aggravated price instability when a freely-trading country’s 
production fluctuates around 100 percent self-sufficiency (i.e., when the country flips 
back and forth between net-export and net-import positions for a given commodity).  
 
Another food security concern may be reliability of foreign supplies (of food aid or 
commercial imports).  This concern suggests the need for new disciplines on export 
restraints (like bans or embargos) as well as seeking commitments from donor countries 
for steady contributions to food aid (perhaps preferably in cash and/or multilateral form) 
as opposed to it being effectively used as a means of irregular surplus disposal.  Also, 
disciplines may be required on the form in which food aid is provided, to prevent it being 
a disguised export subsidy, or having a price-depressive effect (damaging to producers) 
in the local market. 
 
Yet another perceived dimension of the food security concern is sometimes the need to 
reduce large variations in the price at which food imports are available.  This concern 
may be best addressed through rapid reductions in DME export subsidies, and in the 
remaining elements of effectively managed trade (tariff rate quotas , high applied tariffs, 
WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Issues and Options for Bangladesh  3
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etc.) among the DME countries, which exacerbate heavily these world market price 
swings.  Until that happens, however, the landed price of food imports can be stabilized 
by varying the effective import charge; e.g., by invoking price-triggered safeguards, or by 
changing the applied ordinary tariff.  Another option, in the case of storable commodities, 
may be to develop international stockpiles, although past experience has shown that such 
stocks are very difficult to manage.   
 
2.5    THE BIG PICTURE:  THE TILTED PLAYING FIELD 
 
Most DCs are now very well aware that the playing field is currently tilted heavily in 
favour of the DMEs.  While most DCs have export subsidy limits at zero and “amber 
box” domestic support limits at de minimis levels, many DME’s still retain rights to very 
high levels of export and domestic subsidies; subsidies which depress somewhat the 
levels of world market prices but also, and perhaps more importantly for developing 
countries, cause them to be less stable.  These rights have been characterized as 
effectively “special and differential treatment for rich countries”. 
 
Additionally, most DMEs continue to apply high tariffs for the more sensitive 
commodities, manage much of their trade via tariff rate quotas (TRQs) with prohibitive 
over-quota tariffs, and practise tariff escalation widely.  In contrast, DCs, on the whole, 
do not have TRQ commitments (or have access to the associated “Special Safeguard” 
(SSG) mechanism), and apply tariffs at relatively modest levels, albeit enjoying the 
insurance of relatively high tariff bindings
6. 
 
It is apparent that these same DMEs would prefer to reduce their offending export 
subsidies, trade-distorting domestic support, and tariffs only gradually, while requiring 
DCs to keep their export subsidies at zero, to keep their AMSs at de minimis levels, and 
to reduce their tariff bindings rapidly to recently applied levels (or at least tighten the 
rules to deny the DCs flexibility in varying their applied tariff level underneath the 
binding). 
 
Supporting their producers when world market prices plummet is a political imperative 
for most governments.  Witness the large increases in farm support spending introduced 
by the US and Canada in the last few years in response to lower crop prices.  
 
But when their producers are threatened with imports at low (and often subsidized) 
prices, most DCs’ governments can not afford to compensate them through direct 
payment programs as the DME countries can.  Apart from their fiscal resources, DCs also 
differ greatly from DMEs in terms of the practical difficulties associated with targeted 
“green” programs, and the low limits they face on “amber” ones.   In this situation, the 
only feasible means left for DCs to maintain some stability in domestic price (and/or 
producer income) levels is through (relatively cheap, or even revenue-generating) border 
measures. 
WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Issues and Options for Bangladesh  4
                                                           
6 DCs were given the option of nominating a “ceiling binding” in the Uruguay Round, rather than going 
through the rather laborious process of calculating a “tariff equivalent”, and then providing “minimum” 
and/or “current” access opportunities using the “tariff rate quota” mechanism.  Most took up this option for 
most affected products.  However, this then precluded them from using the “special safeguard” (SSG) 
mechanism, which was only made available to those countries “tariffying” (and for those products being 
tariffied) in the normal way.  The SSG, which may be price-triggered or volume-triggered, is a mechanism 
by which countries may impose an import surcharge in a timely way to protect their domestic producers, if 
threatened by import surges.   
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Thus, increasing numbers of DCs are (very legitimately) arguing that, as long as DMEs 
continue to have access to the use of trade-distorting agricultural subsidies, DCs need to 
retain the right to some sort of effective border protection.  In the absence of a practical 
alternative, such as general access to a SSG, this means for most keeping bound tariffs as 
high as possible.  It is also worth noting that, unlike DMEs, DCs are in the main 
constrained to use their available border protection instruments as stabilizing measures, 
rather than for the purpose of permanently elevating domestic prices well above world 
market (import offer) prices.  This because they also have consumers who spend a large 
portion of their income on food and so care a lot about the prices they have to pay for it, 
and whose interests must be balanced against those of producers. 
7 In DMEs, in contrast, 
consumer food price levels are of little political concern. 
 
This imbalance in the level of agricultural protection currently permitted would appear to 
be the most fundamental issue separating DCs and DMEs at this time, and one on which 
there may be a potential for all DCs to agree and to push together to “level the playing 
field”.  Some DMEs (e.g., the DME members of Cairns Group) are more willing to 
recognise it than others.  It implies a clear linkage between what happens in the export 
competition and domestic support areas, on one hand, and what happens in market 
access, on the other, and illustrates that these different areas cannot be effectively 
negotiated in isolation any more. 
 
This ‘S&DT by another name’ has served to perpetuate the situation which existed before 
the last round, with farm support of the rich countries still causing huge distortions in 
patterns of world agricultural production, consumption and trade.  It has created a 
situation where the existing constraints on DC protection and support are generally much 
more severe than those under which DMEs must operate.  DCs do not have a lot of 
negotiating leverage to change this situation if agriculture is negotiated in isolation.   
What they do have is generally high tariff bindings which many DMEs would dearly like 
to see reduced.  DCs should therefore play these to maximum effect to achieve some 
‘leveling of the overall playing field’, by linking any concessions in this area to 
concessions by DMEs in the export and domestic subsidies areas. 
 
2.6  SCOPE OF NEGOTIATIONS  
 
Analytical studies suggest that the biggest potential gains for DCs from multilateral trade 
liberalization would be generated in the agricultural product area. For example, Anderson 
et al (1999) estimate that OECD farm policies cause annual welfare losses of almost $20 
billion for DCs—more than three times the losses of DCs attributable to OECD 
countries’ import restrictions on textiles and clothing.   
 
However, DCs have relatively little to ‘give’ in the agricultural area.  They must think in 
terms of trading gains in agriculture for concessions in other areas.  Conversely, many 
DME countries which are rather protectionist in the agricultural field will find it easier to 
make concessions in agriculture if they can point to ‘gains’ in other areas (e.g., Japan, 
EU).  Thus, progress in the agricultural negotiations is likely to be more significant now 
that the scope of the negotiations has been expanded beyond the “built-in agenda” 
(Agriculture, Services and Intellectual Property (TRIPs)). 
 
                                                           
7 The average Bangladeshi household spends 62 percent of its income on food (FAO, 1997). 
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It would also appear to be in the interests of the Bangladeshi agri-food sector generally 
that negotiations are to begin on subsidies rules (especially relating to fisheries), 
industrial tariffs, and dispute settlement issues (WTO, 2001(a)).  The Doha Declaration 
(para. 42) puts emphasis on the needs of LDCs in the market access area—specifying the 
objective of duty-free and quota-free access for LDC goods—and in the area of technical 
assistance. 
 
In addition, the new “Decision on Implementation-related Issues and Concerns” (WTO, 
2001(b)) puts considerable emphasis on the provision of assistance and adequate time to 
DCs in responding to SPS and TBT requirements of importing countries, and bringing 
customs valuation procedures into WTO-compliance.  There is also an effort to ensure 
that DMEs show more restraint in initiating countervail actions against DCs, and more 
consideration for DCs in completing the implementation of the Textiles Agreement 
(MFA phase-out).  The WTO will work towards a clarification of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement, which will hopefully lead to fewer abuses of the spirit of the WTO rulesin 
that area.  The re-affirmed exemption for LDCs from export subsidy prohibition under 
the Subsidies and Countervail Agreement, may make adoption of a similar provision in 
the agriculture more likely.  
 
3. AGRICULTURAL  NEGOTIATION ISSUES AND TOPICS  
 
Some issues on the current negotiating agenda are ‘left-overs’ from the Uruguay Round 
(UR), when they were recognized but intentionally left off the agenda (or rather, ‘swept 
under the carpet’) at that time.  Others have arisen as difficulties in the course of UR 
implementation, and may be thought of as ‘revealed deficiencies’ in the UR outcome.  
Still others are new issues which have only arisen since the UR was completed.  And 
finally, some agenda items are in the nature of existing (UR) modalities whose 
parameters have to be re-negotiated.  
 
3.1 MARKET  ACCESS 
 
3.1.1  Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs).   
There are several TRQ-related issues which have featured prominently in the discussions 
to date.  In large part, concerns arise because TRQ fill rates have generally been 
disappointing, suggesting that TRQ administration methods have themselves become a 
form of non-tariff barrier
8.   
 
Perhaps the most important TRQ issue for DCs generally is their lack of access to TRQ 
allocations.  Many DME’s provide most or all of their TRQ amounts on a previously-
negotiated, country-specific basis—often largely to other DMEs.  It has been suggested 
that quotas which are not made globally-available should not be able to be counted 
towards TRQ amounts. 
 
Even where TRQs are ostensibly made available on a MFN basis, the method of 
allocation can vary.  Examples include import licences being provided on a ‘first come 
first served’ basis, or to historical importers, or to producer groups, or to a state-trading 
monopoly, or ‘on-demand’, or made subject to auction.  In several cases, it appears that 
the in-quota tariff has simply been applied as an ordinary tariff, with no restrictions on  
 
                                                           
8 TRQ fill rates in OECD countries averaged only 65 percent in the 1995-98 period (OECD 2001). 
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the quantity
9.    
 
Other than administration mechanisms, TRQ issues include the following: 
-  what further expansion of TRQ amounts? 
-  what reductions in over-quota tariffs?  
-  elimination of, or what reductions in, "in-quota" tariffs? 
-  what degree of product aggregation in TRQ commitments is appropriate, and 
whether allocations restricted to a more narrow band of goods than specified 
in the commitment should be allowed? 
-  whether there should be a lower limit on the length of validity of import 
licences under TRQs? 
-  whether conditions such as end-use or local purchase requirements should be 
permitted to be attached to such import licences?   
 
These issues thus somewhat overlap the discussions about how to address the phenomena 
of “tariff peaks” and “tariff dispersion” (see 3.1.4 below).  The author is not clear as to 
whether these are important issues for Bangladesh specifically .  The products involved 
are normally those produced in DME countries.  (Is Bangladesh a potential exporter to 
Europe of sugar, bananas, manioc, arrowroot, salep, grain sorghum, sweet potatoes or 
dried onions, for example?)   
 
3.1.2  Tariff Negotiation Approaches:  
Formula versus product-by-product:  A mixed approach was adopted in the Uruguay 
Round.  Within the bounds of a formula which imposed minimum cuts on all tariff lines 
together with a simple average aggregate reduction, countries entered into bilateral 
bargaining using a “request and offer” approach to determine specific reductions for 
individual products.     
 
Another dimension of this general issue is whether attempts should be made to negotiate 
internationally on a sector-by-sector basis.  The term “zero for zero” has been used by 
advocates of this who see the potential for getting all tariffs eliminated in all countries in 
some commodity sectors (e.g., oilseeds).  Opponents have argued that this approach 
would result in an increase in the general level of tariff dispersion between commodities. 
 
3.1.3  Formula Issues. 
To the extent that a formula is adopted, many other questions arise.  For example, should 
the percentage cuts agreed apply to each and every product, or, as in the Uruguay Round, 
to the aggregate average of all product lines?  If the latter, then should it be a simple 
average, as before, or a trade-weighted average?  Should there again be a minimum 
percentage cut, applicable to all tariff lines, as well as an average cut.  Arguably, if the 
average cut is merely a simple average as in the UR, then the minimum percentage will 
be the more important figure. 
 
As discussed above, a key point for developing countries is whether any agreed 
reductions (in bound tariff rates) would begin from existing levels of tariff bindings or 
from existing (or recent past) levels of the corresponding applied tariff (the US has 
proposed the latter).  Only those few DCs whose bound tariffs are already close to 
applied levels (like Egypt) are likely to be willing to accept the latter proposal. 
 
                                                           
9 Even here, under-fill often results, and measured nominal protection coefficient may be lower than the 
tariff applied (OECD 2001), which suggests that, in such cases, the in-quota tariff falls far short of the 
agreed Uruguay Round principle that it be at “low or minimal rate” (“Modalities” document, Annex 3, 
para. 14, GATT Secretariat, 1993). 
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3.1.4  Tariff Peaks and Tariff Dispersion.   
Many countries still have a few bound agricultural tariffs at very high levels.  This 
implies a differentiation in the level of protection between commodity groups which is 
arguably much more seriously trade-distorting than when the same average level of 
support and protection is applied evenly across all commodities.  Countries like Japan 
with sensitive commodities and high “tariff peaks” tend to favour the flexibility of the 
product-by-product approach.  For this very reason, it seems that this issue will only be 
effectively addressed if a formula approach to tariff reductions is adopted. 
 
Suggestions for addressing this issue mainly involve either some form of leveling 
formula (e.g., like the “Swiss formula”, used for industrial tariffs in a previous Round) 
which would reduce higher tariffs by a higher percentage amount, or simply establishing 
an upper ceiling on all tariff bindings. 
 
3.1.5  Tariffication of Remaining (illegal) NTBs   
Some countries failed to tariffy some non-tariff barriers at the end of the UR as they were 
supposed to, according to the agreed modalities.  In some cases, these were effectively 
‘negotiated exceptions’, like minimum import prices for pork in Japan and for some fruits 
and vegetables in the EU, and the EU’s new cereals import regime.  In some cases, 
particularly involving DCs, the failure to tariffy may have reflected a lack of 
understanding of the requirements.  A possible example is the continued existence, in 
some countries, of discretionary (non-automatic) import licensing schemes, in some cases 
linked with local purchase or local content requirements.  In yet other cases involving 
variable applied tariffs, such as price band schemes and seasonal tariffs, it can be 




3.1.6  Tariff Complexity   
The long-term WTO objective, for reasons of transparency, is to reach a point where all 
tariffs would be a simple ad valorem (percentage) tariff.  Currently, several cases of 
combinations of specific and ad valorem tariffs exist.  More seriously, several countries 
still apply various other border charges, in addition to the ordinary tariff (customs duty).  
The issue is whether some commitment to reduce or eliminate existing complex tariffs 
and/or to convert specific tariffs should be part of a new agreement. 
 
3.1.7  Importing State Trading Enterprises (STEs)   
Are more disciplines called for?  In Bangladesh’s case the Sugar and Food Industries 
Corporation (BSFIC) is the sole importer of sugar
11.  Do the activities of any STEs of 
other countries pose problems for any of Bangladesh’s agricultural exports ?. 
 
3.1.8  Special Agricultural Safeguard (SSG)   
These have been not much used and are not widely available, particularly to DCs.  Some 
countries favour eliminating them altogether.  Others propose extending their availability 
to all countries and more products.  Still others would eliminate them for DMEs while 
making them available broadly to DCs as a S&DT provision.  There have also been 
proposals for changing some of the existing details governing just how and when the SSG 
may be applied. 
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3.2  EXPORT COMPETITION 
 
3.2.1  Export Subsidy Reductions.   
Without any right to use export subsidies itself, the interest of Bangladesh, like that of 
most developing countries, would seem to be to achieve as rapid as possible elimination 
of the use of export subsidies by others, particularly DMEs.  It is significant that hotly-
contested wording referring to a “phasing out” of export subsidies was retained in the 
final Doha Declaration text, despite strong EU (French) opposition (WTO, 2001(a), para. 
13).  Export subsidies cause world prices to be lower and more unstable, by allowing 
exporting countries to maintain higher internal prices, thus stimulating production, and to 
maintain steady internal prices, by exporting varying amounts of domestic surplus.  If a 
total elimination can not be achieved in this ‘round’, then a strong case may exist for 
tightening the existing commitments.  For example, in addition to existing quantity and 
expenditure reduction commitments, binding limits could be imposed on ‘per unit export 
subsidy’ levels, which would mirror the per unit limits already existing on import taxes 
(tariff bindings).  Also, the existing disciplines could be applied in a more disaggregated 
fashion, rather than at the “product group” level.  Furthermore, the possibility for 
countries to “roll forward” any unused export subsidy entitlements could be removed.  
Another issue is whether to make further reductions from current limits or from recent 
use levels. 
 
3.2.2  Export Subsidy Definitions   
There is a widespread concern that the existing definition of “export subsidies” is not 
broad enough, and that several practices which are in effect export subsidies are escaping 
discipline.  This is why examination of export credits (and credit guarantees), the 
practices of exporting state trading enterprises (STEs), and food aid practices are all 
being discussed in the context of the ongoing negotiations.  As a recipient and importer, 
Bangladesh will have to assess whether it stands to benefit or lose from a tightening of 
the international disciplines in these areas.  Clearly, these issues are of crucial importance 
to Bangladesh, from a food security perspective, and its negotiators will at least want to 
monitor closely developments in this particular debate.  Bangladesh has no agricultural 
exporting STEs itself. 
 
3.2.3   Export Restraints 
Export restraints can include export bans, country-specific embargos, and export taxes 
(which may be fixed or variable).  Current disciplines are recognized as weak.  Many 
importing countries see the necessity for stronger disciplines, as a ‘security of supply’ 
issue.  This would appear to be also in Bangladesh’s long-term interests.  Bangladesh 
apparently still maintains several export prohibitions and restrictions in the agricultural 
area (e.g., oilseeds & edible oil, wheat, pulses, molasses, onions, and various types of live 
animals still appear on the “negative list”).
12 Therefore, any new disciplines in this area 
could potentially imply the need for policy changes by the Bangladesh government.     
 
3.3  DOMESTIC SUPPORT 
 
3.3.1  Total Domestic Support Limits or Reductions 
It has been proposed that there should be a limit on total government spending in support 
of agriculture, which could be expressed as a percentage of the total value of agricultural 
production.  This appears, to reflect in part, a concern about the tendency for 
unconstrained “green” box support to grow to high levels in some DME countries, which 
will not be conducive to a “level playing field” ever being reached.  In part it seems also 
to reflect an uneasiness with the current “green box” criteria being somewhat arbitrary, 
                                                           
12 WTO (2000), p.59-60. 
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and the AMS calculation being too complicated and so lacking in transparency and 
subject to manipulation.  
 
3.3.2  Amber Box (AMS) Reductions.   
Like most DCs, with its own limits already at the de minimis level, Bangladesh has 
nothing to lose and much to gain from heavy cuts in permitted levels of the more trade-
distorting types of domestic support.  Such cuts would impact almost entirely on DME 
countries, and would contribute to ‘leveling’ the currently ‘very tilted playing field’ (see 
discussion in Section 2.6 above).  Some have suggested that future reductions begin from 
recent “current total AMS” levels, rather than from existing country limits. 
 
3.3.3  AMS Definition.   
Countries with a positive (non-zero) AMS limit have the flexibility to shift support as 
much as they like between commodities (and between “product-specific” and “non-
product-specific” support).  On the other hand, the de minimis limit faced by countries 
like Bangladesh is effectively a limit on product-specific support for each individual farm 
commodity.  This results from the way the AMS is currently defined and calculated, and 
could be easily changed, either by applying AMS limits at a more disaggregated, 
commodity-by-commodity level for all countries, or by applying the de minimis limit at 
the aggregate level only.  The current situation is inherently unfair and a change one way 
or the other would seem to be clearly in the interest of Bangladesh and most DCs. 
 
3.3.4  Expanding either the ‘Green Box’ or the ‘Development Box’,or Raising the 
de minimis Percentage Level.
13   
Quite a lot has already been said by developing countries about the desirability of 
widening the scope for agricultural development or “food security” (probably production-
stimulating) expenditures which could be made free of any commitment for reduction.  
However, the existing DC de minimis (10 percent of the value of production for “product-
specific” support and another 10 percent for “non-product-specific” support) allows such 
a country to provide up to 20 percent of the value of production in “amber” (non-exempt) 
support, over and above whatever it provides in “green” (exempt) support.  This is 
actually a relatively high level of support, and the reality is that most DCs in fact provide 
support well below the existing WTO de minimis levels
14.  This is because the fiscal 
limits for these poorer countries are in reality much more constraining than the WTO 
limits—a situation which seems unlikely to change for a long time.  In this situation, it is 
difficult to see any real benefits arising from such countries being able to raise their WTO 
limits.  And by not raising them, they are in a much stronger position to argue for a 
substantial reduction in the limits facing DME countries.  Some countries favour 
tightening the Annex 2 criteria and narrowing the scope of the green box. 
 
3.3.5  ‘Blue Box’   
WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Issues and Options for Bangladesh  10
                                                          
Another important domestic support issue concerns the ‘blue box’, invented at ‘the last 
minute’ in the Uruguay Round by the US and EU alone, in order to protect some of their 
own programs.  The US has subsequently changed its programs and no longer has need of 
the ‘blue box’.  Few would dispute that ‘blue box’ programs, which require some limits 
on production by individual farmers, are, nevertheless, ‘trade-distorting’ (perhaps less 
 
13 The ‘Green Box’ is used here to mean domestic support measures which meet the criteria of Annex 2 of 
the Agreement on Agriculture.  The ‘Development Box’, available to DCs only, includes programs defined 
in Article 6.2. 
14 It is easy to show, with reasonable assumptions, that a country providing non-exempt support within de 
minimis levels (Total AMS = 0) may quite conceivably have an aggregate PSE in the order of 50 percent or 
more 
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than ‘amber box’ programs, but certainly more than ‘green box’ programs).  For the EU, 
and a few other smaller countries, the ‘blue box’ now accounts for a significant part of 
that large amount of farm support expenditure which is not only trade-distorting, but 
which results in the huge imbalance between what DMEs and DCs are, in general, 
currently allowed to do.  It is hard to see it as not being in Bangladesh’s and most DCs’ 
interests to be among those countries calling for an elimination of the ‘blue box’. 
 
3.3.6  Technical AMS issues.   
Some countries with above-de minimis AMS limits have complained about the erosion in 
the value of these limits due to heavy inflation and/or exchange rate depreciation , 
given that the AMS must be calculated using current currency units.  Others have 
suggested that this should not be a problem as these countries have the option to express 
their limits and do their calculations using another, more stable, currency (e.g., US$ or 
SDR).  Perhaps this issue needs clarifying, but it does not affect the majority of DCs 
whose limits are at de minimis.  
 
Another technical AMS issue which clearly does need clarifying has been raised by India, 
in particular.  That is whether an effectively negative ‘market price support’ 
component (domestic product prices kept artificially below world market-equivalent 
levels) can be used to offset other positive components (e.g., fertilizer subsidies), in the 
calculation of the AMS.  This may be of minor concern for Bangladesh, in that it could 
affect product-specific AMS calculations in a few commodity areas where domestic 
prices may be kept below import offer prices through the use of trade restrictions.
15  
 
A third issue concerns the level of aggregation of the AMS commitment.  The UR 
Agreement resulted in a single numerical limit for each country, which has allowed some 
countries to increase non-exempt support in some commodity areas.  Some feel that the 
limits should apply on a more disaggregated basis, such as the export subsidy limits do. 
 
3.4 OTHER  ISSUES 
 
3.4.1  Peace Clause (Due restraint) 
Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture makes “green box” measures free from threat 
of any countervail action by other countries, until 2004.  Similarly, amber measures and 
export subsidies applied within a country’s WTO limits are ‘off-limits’ for certain types 
of GATT complaints during this period.  It has been argued that this Article provides an 
incentive for countries to shift their support from amber to green types, and that countries 
are doing this.  At issue here is whether the applicability of this Article should be 
extended beyond 2004, and whether the scope of the Article should be revised.   
 
3.4.2  Environment & Animal Welfare Issues 
There appear to be two main elements to this debate.  One is whether the existing 
provisions of the Annex 2 criteria permitting direct payments to farmers for 
environmental purposes are sufficient.  The other is whether countries which impose 
extra costs on their producers via environmental and animal welfare regulations should be 
permitted to somehow constrain imports of the same good from countries whose 
producers do not face the same costs.  There is an agreement to begin somewhat limited 
negotiations on Trade and the Environment (WTO, 2001(a), para. 31), but it is not clear 
WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Issues and Options for Bangladesh  11
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that these particular issues will be addressed there.  There may be pressure to deal with 
them in the agriculture negotiations. 
 
3.4.3  Food Safety 
Several trade disputes have arisen in recent years, reflecting technological advances, 
particularly in the area of biotechnology, and including genetically-modified organisms 
and products.  Strictly, these are issues which fall under the scope of the Agreements on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), and 
revolve around the interpretation/use of the “precautionary principle” and the concept of 
compulsory labeling, respectively.  Particularly important examples of these issues are 
the European Union's resistance to importing beef which has been produced using growth 
hormones, and to importing the products derived from genetically-modified crop 
varieties.  These issues appear to be so important that, until new negotiations are begun in 
the SPS and TBT areas, there may be strong pressure to try to deal with them in the 
negotiations on agriculture.  The issue of food safety is becoming increasingly important 
to consumers in DMEs.  It would not be realistic for DCs to expect to be given exemption 
from DME food control standards.  Those wanting to export food products to countries 
with higher food safety standards should accept the need for upgrading their own food 
control systems, while seeking as much financial and technical assistance as possible 
from the DMEs for this. 
 
3.4.4  Geographical Appellations 
This is one of several issues important to agriculture being addressed in the negotiations 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).  There is now an 
agreement to negotiate a “multilateral system of notification and registration of 
geographical indications” covering wines and spirits (WTO, 2001(a), para. 18).  Some 
European countries would like to extend the same provisions to a broader range of 
agricultural products.  Many countries are not in favour.  Some developing or transition 
countries may have an interest in this issue.  For example, Georgia has an interest in 
stopping certain other former-soviet bloc countries from producing ‘counterfeit’ versions 
of some of its more famous wines.  Does Bangladesh have any geographic regions which 
have established a reputation for producing unique types of tea, or spice, or some other 
crop, which can command a price premium on the world market, and for which 
Bangladesh would have an interest in preventing other countries from falsely labeling 
their product with a Bangladeshi appellation? 
 
3.4.5  Biodiversity, Indigenous Rights & Intellectual Piracy 
This is another set of TRIPs issues which impinge to a considerable degree on 
agriculture, although extending beyond it.  One issue is the consistency of the current 
TRIPs Agreement with the Convention on Biological Diversity, now to be examined 
under the new work program for TRIPs (WTO, 2001(a), para. 19).  Several cases have 
arisen where DME nationals or enterprises have taken plants or other life forms from 
DCs, and patented them or their extracts or traditional uses as their own (e.g., the Indian 
neem tree case).  This has given rise to the concept of “intellectual piracy”, and a 
widespread feeling that the existing TRIPs Agreement needs clarifying or modifying to 
prevent this possibility.  It is somewhat linked to another TRIPs requirement for countries 
to put in place legal protection for plant breeders rights, which many DCs are having 
difficulty in implementing. 
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4.  SPECIAL & DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT (S&DT) OPTIONS: 
BANGLADESH’S INTERESTS 
 
As a cautionary note, it has been suggested that the more DCs are subject to special 
provisions and exemptions the less leverage and influence they can expect to have in 
negotiating the basic rules to which they will ultimately be obliged to fully adhere. 
16 
Thus, it may be in their longer-term interests for DCs to show some restraint in their 
pursuit of S&DT.  However, it now appears that many of the most important concerns for 
DCs can be addressed without creating rules or commitments which are different for DCs 
than for other countries; it would be sufficient just for DC’s interests to be allowed to 
prevail on issues such as: 
 
-  the ‘starting point’ for tariff cuts (bound levels or applied levels); 
-  reduction or elimination of tariff escalation; 
-  clarification of the rules concerning the variation of applied tariffs over time 
(identification of which schemes involving variable applied tariffs are 
legitimate and which are not);  
-  achieving substantial reductions or elimination of export subsidies; 
-  substantial reductions in AMS limits and/or new total domestic support limits; 
-  ‘blue box’ elimination; 
-  rates of increase of minimum access amounts (TRQs) and of reductions in 
tariff peaks, in over-quota tariffs, in in-quota tariffs, and in managed trade 
generally. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, some special provisions for DCs and for LDCs will 
undoubtedly also be desirable.  Some countries are also calling for further differentiation 
in S&DT provisions, so that some would apply only to “net food importing” developing 
countries (NFIDCs) and some only to “small” developing countries (SDCs). 
 
4.1  MARKET ACCESS AREA 
   
4.1.1  Existing Provisions 
The key market access S&DT provision of the Uruguay Round applying to Bangladesh, 
as one of the “least developed countries” (LDCs), is the exemption from reduction 
obligations on tariff bindings.  Bangladesh might anticipate that some countries will resist 
the unconditional continuation of this provision in a new agreement.  Some may suggest, 
for example, that it apply to tariff bindings only up to a certain level(say 100 
percent)beyond which even LDCs should be making reductions, particularly if the 
concept of universally-applying ceiling limits on the level of tariff bindings is accepted as 
a means to reduce the incidence of tariff ‘peaks’. 
 
4.1.2  Retention of the Potential for (Stabilizing) Border Protection. 
WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Issues and Options for Bangladesh  13
                                                          
This may well be the most important negotiating issue for countries like Bangladesh, 
unless heavy trade-distorting subsidisation and protection by DME countries can be 
eliminated quickly, which seems highly unlikely.  With relatively high tariff bindings, 
and the prospect of being once again exempt from reducing them, this point may seem to 
be less important for Bangladesh than for many DCs.  However, it would seem to be in 
Bangladesh's longer-term interests to add its voice to the call for one of these options, and 
 
16 One assumes that as the level of economic development of countries improve it will lead to "graduation". 
 
 CPD Occasional Paper Series 15 
at least to obtain a clarification of the rules concerning how applied tariffs may be varied 
over time.  The issue has been discussed above in the Section 2.6.  Several options 
present themselves as means to this end but they are not all mutually exclusive: 
 
-  Preserve tariff bindings at existing levels (or reduce them only minimally).  Most 
DCs have agricultural tariff bindings which are well above their applied rates.  
Bangladesh’s bound tariffs are particularly high, being at a uniform 200 
percent across nearly all agricultural products.  This situation may cause 
Bangladesh to be a particular target for those DMEs anxious to close the gap 
between bound and applied tariff levels in DCs (the gap is largely closed in 
the case of the DMEs, where most applied tariffs coincide with bound levels).  
It also means that Bangladesh has more scope than most DCs to agree to 
significant reductions in bound tariff levels while still retaining considerable 
effective ‘room’ for varying the level of the applied tariff.  A desirable 
corollary to this implicit recognition of the rights of DCs to a continued use of 
a variably-applied ordinary tariff as a contingency protection instrument 
would be a clarification of the rules governing which forms of variable tariff 
mechanisms (currently ranging from seasonal tariffs, through ‘sliding scale’ 
and ‘price band’ schemes, to ‘minimum import price’ and other schemes 
involving the automatic imposition of variable border charges) are permissible 
and which are not. 
 
-  Provide general access for all DCs to a SSG-like instrument (at least for all 
sensitive products, which could be nominated in advance).  In the Uruguay 
Round, the new SSG was only made available to countries “tariffying” 
(converting non-tariff barriers to their “equivalent tariff”), and only for the 
products concerned.  With a few exceptions, it was only DMEs which 
implemented tariffication, and which now have rights to use the SSG.  In 
general, the rules associated with the use of the broad safeguards 
(countervailing duties, anti-dumping duties) make them unsuitable for use by 
the DCs (too slow, costly, resource-demanding and cumbersome) for 
agricultural contingency protection.  The SSG has the advantage that it can be 
implemented quickly, based on either a price trigger or an import volume 
trigger.  
 
-  Special Countervailing Duty (CVD) rules for DCs.  Argentina and some other 
countries have recently suggested that DCs should have the right to impose 
countervailing duties (CVDs) without the normal requirements of 
investigating and proving (1) the existence of injury to the domestic industry, 
and (2) the causal link between foreign subsidies and this injury.  They 
propose that the CVD would be automatically imposed against the products of 
a country having a right to use export subsidies and/or amber box domestic 
subsidies in excess of de minimis levels.  This may be another option here. 
 
-  Formally link formula reductions in DC bound tariff levels to formula reductions 
in DME export subsidies and AMS levels.  The simplest approach may be to 
negotiate the parameters attached to the reduction formulii in the three areas 
of tariffs (at least for DCs), export subsidies (all countries) and AMS (all 
countries) at the same time, ensuring that only substantial agreed reductions in 
the last two areas would be sufficient to trigger moderate reductions in the 
first.  Another option may be to introduce the possibility of different reduction 
rates applying to different countries.  For example, there could be a provision 
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that the required percentage reduction in tariff bindings for any given country 
would vary proportionately with the degree to which that country’s AMS 
limits are above de minimis, and with the degree to which that country’s 
export subsidy expenditure limits exceed zero, both expressed as a percentage 
of the total value of agricultural production. 
 
4.1.3  Elimination of Tariff Escalation   
The general tendency for countries to impose higher tariffs on progressively further 
processed forms of the same basic good has long been recognized as imposing serious 
economic costs on developing countries.  In the case of Bangladesh, for instance, perhaps 
jute or tea or spices are exported in raw form, only to have considerable value added in 
other countries, via various further processing and packaging activities—activities which 
might more logically be located in Bangladesh were it not for the much higher foreign 
import tariffs which would then be faced on the exported items. Some European countries 
rate among the biggest agricultural product exporters in the world, largely on the basis of 
the value of the transformed cocoa and sugar (chocolate, confectionary, biscuits/cookies), 
coffee and tea (blended and packaged), etc. which they export, having previously 
imported the same in the raw form.  Much scope exists, to their potential benefit, for 
relocating some of these processing activities in the DCs where the raw products 
originate.  A necessary pre-requisite for this would appear to be to get rid of all instances 
of tariff escalation.  Of course, processing interests in the DME countries can be expected 
to desperately oppose any such change.  It can not be left to traditional product-by-
product bilateral “request and offer” negotiations.  The only chance for success here is to 
have it accepted as a general principle, and incorporated formally in a formula approach 
to tariff reductions.   
 
Some DCs have in the past been induced to impose export restrictions on raw products as 
a means to counter the effects of other countries’ tariff escalation, and to ‘keep the 
processing at home’.  Further disciplines on export restrictions are proposed by some as 
part of the agenda under the “export competition” part of the negotiations.  There is an 
obvious link here, and an opportunity for DCs to insist on the introduction of new 
disciplines on export restrictions being made conditional on the acceptance of the 
elimination of tariff escalation. 
 
A cautionary note needed here is that many DCs also use tariff escalation.  Bangladesh is 
one of these.  Its average applied tariffs on food products are 16 percent at the first stage 
of processing, 23 percent at the semi-processed stage, and 29 percent at the fully-
processed stage.
17  It may be realistic to expect that DMEs would agree to accept to 
exempt DCs or LDCs from the elimination of escalation as a S&DT provision, but many 
DCs may themselves not be in favor of such an exemption. 
 
4.1.4.  Repeat Opportunity for Tariffication   
Some DCs have reasonably argued that they did not have time to fully understand all the 
technicalities of the Uruguay Round Agreement when they compiled their schedules of 
commitments.  As a result, some failed to convert into tariffs some of their existing NTBs 
which had become illegal, and some failed to specify (or roll into their ordinary tariffs) 
some “other border charges”.  These countries are calling for a second opportunity for 
tariffication, now that they understand the technicalities better, which would effectively 
just allow them to exercise their rights already negotiated under the terms of the Uruguay 
WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Issues and Options for Bangladesh  15
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Round Agreement (i.e., ‘to play catch-up’).  This would imply revising some existing 
tariff bindings upward.  With its own high tariff bindings, Bangladesh would probably be 
able to easily convert its remaining agricultural NTBs (e.g., discretionary import licences 
and other quantitative restrictions or bans on sugar, chicks and table eggs imports) to 
higher applied tariffs, even if a second opportunity for tariffication was not formally 
granted.  Thus this issue may be of less concern for Bangladesh.  
 
4.1.5.  Elimination of Tariffs on All LDC Products in DME Markets 
(Note: options 4.1.4, 4.1.5 and 4.1.6 below would not be relevant for Bangladesh 
if this option is adopted) 
There may be a good chance that the recent unilateral EU tariff elimination on most 
products from LDCs can be made complete, and emulated by all other DMEs.  It would 
obviously be in Bangladesh’s interests to continue to lobby strongly for this.  If 
unsuccessful here, then at least two of the next three options will become important for 
Bangladesh, and the potential benefits for this country will presumably be higher if any 
such concession is made only to LDCs, rather than to DCs more generally.  
 
4.1.6.  Minimize DC Tariff Preference Erosion, and Non-Discrimination in 
Preferences   
In the Uruguay Round, there was no obligation for countries to extend the negotiated 
reductions in their MFN tariffs to the corresponding GSP and other preferential tariffs 
which existed at lower levels.  Consequently a considerable erosion in these tariff 
preferences occurred.  Several DCs have called for such preferences to be reinstated or 
preserved, as an S&DT provision, in a new agreement, to the extent that this is possible 
(i.e., to the point where the preferential tariff becomes zero).  This idea would 
presumably have the support of Bangladesh.  Perhaps of even more importance to 
Bangladesh, is the removal of tariff preferences which apply to only some DCs, thus 
discriminating against the others.  The most obvious example of this is  the tariff 
preference offered by the EU to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries under 
the Lomé and Cotonu Agreements .  As a non-ACP country, Bangladesh is discriminated 
against by such restricted preferences
18.   
 
4.1.7.  Greater DME (MFN) Tariff Cuts (or Elimination) on Products of Interest to 
DCs or Just LDCs.   
It has been suggested that a provision along these lines could be built into a general tariff 
reduction formula, as an S&DT measure.  It would require an identification of, and 
agreement among all parties on the list of products to be included here.  The required 
(minimum and average) percentage tariff cuts would then be at some negotiated higher 
level for those products on the agreed list. 
 
4.1.8.  Preferential TRQ Allocations to DCs or LDCs. 
The possible new requirement that TRQ quantities be only made available on an MFN 
basis could include an exception to cover cases where country-specific allocations are 
made to DCs, or just to LDCs.  This option is probably of little potential value to 
Bangladesh, as none or few of the products involved are those in which Bangladesh has 
an export interest. 
 
                                                           
18 These restricted preferences were only WTO-legal because they were covered by a waiver, which has 
now expired.  A related issue, which might easily be drawn into the negotiations, is whether this waiver 
should be extended, as the EU and ACP countries are requesting. 
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4.2 EXPORT  COMPETITION  AREA 
 
4.2.1  Existing Provisions 
As a DC, Bangladesh is entitled to use of certain types of export subsidies until 
2006 without being subject to reduction commitments
19.  As a LDC, Bangladesh would 
anyway be0 exempt from reduction commitments.  However, its WTO schedule does not 
specify a limit on agricultural export subsidies, implying that it has reserved no right to 
use export subsidies other than those exempted for DCs.  It appears that the only 
agricultural export subsidies recently granted by Bangladesh are in the “crash program” 
areas of flowers and certain fruits and vegetables, and include air freight and credit 
subsidies.
20  The main interest for Bangladesh in the current negotiations may be to 
maintain and extend the existing S&DT provisions applying to LDCs in this area. 
 
4.2.2  New Provisions 
Bangladesh will presumably also want to secure commensurate relief from any new 
disciplines or commitments on export subsidies or export credits.  Another concern will 
e to try to ensure that any new disciplines on food aid are in Bangladesh’s interests.  b
  
4.3  DOMESTIC SUPPORT AREA 
 
4.3.1.  Existing Provisions 
As a DC, Bangladesh is entitled to a de minimis limit of 10 percent of the value of farm 
production on product-specific amber support and an additional 10 percent on non-
product-specific amber support.  As its existing support is well below these limits, it does 
not really benefit from the exemption for LDCs from AMS reduction commitments (like 
most other LDCs).  As a DC, it also benefits from the ability to exclude certain types of 
support programs, not covered by the ‘green box’, from its AMS calculations.  These 
programs, specified in Article 6.2 of the Agreement, are sometimes referred to 
collectively as the ‘development box’.  Presumably, the retention of these existing S&DT 
provisions in the domestic support area would be a minimum requirement for DCs and 
LDCs, respectively, in a new agreement.   
 
4.3.2.  Bigger ‘Development’ Box for DCs.   
As already discussed (Section 3.3.4 above), few DCs are operating anywhere near their 
current limits for ‘amber’ box spending, so it is hard to see how most could possibly 
benefit, at least for a very long time, from a reclassification of some existing ‘amber’ 
programs as ‘exempt’.  Ii is expected that this would be the case for Bangladesh as well. 
 
4.3.3.  Exemption from Anti-Dumping and/or Countervailing Duties. 
It is conceivable that a renewed “peace clause” could include a S&DT provision along 
these lines, for agricultural exports from LDCs.  Bangladesh could support such a 
concept if it felt that any of its agricultural product exports were at risk of such “trade 
remedy” action on the part of other countries. 
 
4.4  OTHER AREAS RELATING TO S&DT 
 
4.4.1  Technical and Financial Assistance. 
At Doha, the Indian Minister suggested that, in the Uruguay Round, DCs had been “given 
a cheque which bounced”.  It would seem that DME promises for future technical or 
financial assistance are easier to make than to keep.  However, there may now be more 
                                                           
19 Agreement on Agriculture, Article 9. 
20 WTO (2000), p.69. 
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appreciation among DMEs of the genuine need for such assistance, and a genuine 
willingness to make certain such commitments in a more binding way.  DCs should 
continue to push hard, and take care to ensure that the commitments are real.   
 
4.4.2  Creation of a New International Financial Facility 
There has been much dissatisfaction with the implementation of the two Marakesh 
“Decisions” on LDCs and net-food-importing developing countries (NFIDCs), 
respectively.  A major underlying concern is that the removal of subsidies could cause 
international grain prices to be substantially higher, to the detriment of importing 
countries.  One of the proposed means to address this situation has been the establishment 
of an international revolving fund on which LDCs could draw to finance their basic food 
imports in times of difficulty. 
 
4.4.3  Graduation.   
The fewer DCs which exist, the more valuable the preferential treatment to those which 
remain.  It would seem to be very much in the interests of the poorer DCs, like 
Bangladesh to seek a clarification and tightening of the rules governing how long 
countries may continue to call themselves “developing” as they become richer.  For one 
thing, the magnitude of S&DT concessions which the DMEs are prepared to make would 
surely rise if countries like Korea, Turkey, etc. were not included in the DC group. 
   
5.  POSSIBLE ELEMENTS FOR A NEGOTIATION STRATEGY 
 
5.1  THE SETTING 
 
5.1.1  WTO Negotiations are Not a Good Place to Look for Handouts 
DME negotiators do not, in general, see multilateral trade negotiations as a mechanism 
for their countries to be dispensing aid to less fortunate countries.  These countries all 
have their own foreign aid programs, and also help to finance the multilateral agencies 
like the World Bank, the IMF and various UN development agencies.  There is a growing 
recognition of trade as a means to aid, but still a reluctance to depart, in trade 
negotiations, from the long-established principle of “reciprocity” of benefits, or to 
exchange general aid concessions for trade concessions.  In addition, most governments 
and their negotiators operate with a very mercantilist mindset in the conduct of trade 
negotiations; exports are good, imports are bad.   
 
5.1.2  Political Realities in DMEs (EU and US in particular) 
Certain farm commodity groups are very powerful.  Politicians will not say no to them 
unless there is a clear reason, such as to gain benefits for other groups in society who are 
even more powerful.
21 Thus, if DME governments are to give up on farm protection and 
subsidies they must be given a good reason; appealing to economic theory or their sense 
of generosity probably will not yield much.  Trade negotiations involve bargaining 
(‘good old-fashioned horse-trading’). 
 
5.1.3  Importance of Negotiating Blocs/Coalitions 
Negotiating practicalities (limited time, resources, etc) dictate that expressed positions of 
the more important traders will receive more attention.  Small members have the right to 
their say, individually, but it is easy for other countries to ignore them. By negotiating as 
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a single bloc, the EU countries have for some time ensured a negotiating position at least 
equally powerful as that of the US. 
 
In the Uruguay Round negotiations on agriculture, 14 “smaller agricultural exporting 
countries” (the “Cairns Group”) were able to put forward a common position on most 
issues and to have considerable influence on the outcome (collectively they accounted for 
more agricultural trade than the US).  They did not, however, negotiate as a single bloc 
like the EU.  The Cairns Group is again active in the current negotiations, having now 
expanded to 17 countries, all except 3 of which are DCs.
22
 
Another developing country grouping to have emerged includes Pakistan and Sri Lanka, 
as well as about 9 other African and Latin American countries (joined by India for their 
third position paper on market access).  These are sometimes referred to as the “like-
minded group” and include some of the most active members of the informal larger 
“South Group” which has been meeting regularly in Geneva, drawing on the assistance of 
a permanent ‘secretariat’. 
 
On some issues an “African Group” of 41 countries have spoken with one voice.  Already 
existing economic groupings like MERCOSUR, ASEAN and CARICOM have also put 
forward joint papers.  A grouping of 9 “small island developing states” (SIDS) have 
tabled one formal paper.  A grouping of 12 “transition countries” has tabled two papers. 
 
There is some overlap in the above groupings; they are not mutually exclusive.  Some 
small countries (e.g., Mauritius & Namibia) have participated actively and put forward 
some thoughtful and detailed papers.  However, it is through their input into the African 
Group joint papers that they are likely to have any real influence. 
 
The key point is that the DCs’ voice will be stronger and more influential to the extent 
that they can stand together and avoid division.  Bangladesh might consider aligning 
itself with an existing grouping and working to influence the details of that group’s 
evolving position from within. 
 
5.2  THE INITIAL PROCESS 
 
5.2.1  Identifying What You Want From the Negotiations 
Where do the potential benefits lie?  Reference has already been made (Section 2.7 
above) to analytical evidence that DCs in general have more to gain in agriculture than in 
any other area of the negotiations.  The extent to which this is true for Bangladesh in 
particular has no doubt been the focus of examination within the country.  It will be 
assumed here that there are at least significant potential benefits to be gained by 
Bangladesh from a successful agricultural outcome. 
 
In agriculture, the answers to this question may include the following: 
-  better access to DME markets (lower tariffs, removal of tariff escalation) for 
own products while retaining existing bilateral or LDC preferences as much as 
possible; 
-  significant reduction or elimination of huge DME subsidies (export & 
domestic, possibly including ‘green’ ones) 
-  retention of own ability to protect producers against world market 
downswings; 
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-  retention of maximum scope for own farm development spending (in support 
of food security, agricultural diversification, rural development, etc. goals); 
-  prevention of ‘environmental’, ‘food safety’, and other concerns becoming 
acceptable grounds for a new generation of agricultural protective measures; 
-  maximum access to agri-food sector technical assistance and food aid on 
favourable terms. 
 
In other areas, they may include: 
-  new disciplines to remove the abuse of anti-dumping measures; 
-  new disciplines on and reduction of fisheries subsidies; 
-  bringing multinational corporations under effective and enforceable 
competition rules; 
-  amendment of TRIPs Agreement to protect against intellectual piracy and 
high-priced medicines; 
-  full implementation of UR commitments by DMEs;  
-  rationalisation of rules of origin to suit the modern trading realities (e.g., with 
respect to apparel); 
-  prevention of ‘environmental’ and ‘labor’ standards becoming legitimate 
grounds for a new generation of disguised protective measures; 
 
5.2.2  Identifying What You Have That the Other Countries Want 
Normally, those other countries will be willing to assist in this, while concealing as long 
as possible how much they are willing to ‘pay’.  Again there will be answers in the 




-  high tariff bindings 
 
In other fields: 
-  service industry access (e.g., financial services); 
-  TRIPs: intellectual property legislation/protection; 
-  trade facilitation (‘less red tape at the border’);  
-  TRIMs: more receptive, transparent and secure foreign investment conditions; 
 
5.2.3  Deciding how Broad the Negotiations Must be for the Needed Trade-offs to 
Occur 
This will depend on to what extent the answers to the previous two questions together 
yield a balanced or unbalanced list of ‘wants’ and ‘bargaining chips’ in each area.  If, for 
example, Bangladesh (or a coalition group of countries) has more to get than to give in 
agriculture, then trade-offs between agriculture and other sectors may have to be 
contemplated.  Each country must ask what combination of different areas is desirable to 
be included in a new round in order for a balanced overall result to emerge.  In general, if 
the scope of negotiations is kept narrow the expected result will be smaller.  
 
If it is decided that there is not scope to attain agricultural goals without trade-offs in 
other areas, then the next logical question is whether the present “built-in agenda”, 
including services and TRIPs as well as agriculture, provides enough scope for the 
necessary trade-offs on both sides.  If the answer is yes, given resource constraints, it may 
be sensible for a DC to oppose a broader negotiation agenda.  If the answer is still ‘no’, 
then support for a broader “round” makes more sense. 
 
Although the decision to broaden the scope of the ongoing negotiations has already been 
taken at Doha, the commencement in some areas (investment, competition, government 
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procurement and trade facilitation – the so-called “new” or “Singapore” issues) has been 
deferred until after the next (5
th) Ministerial Meeting , at which time the scope of each 
will be more clearly defined.  Thus some flexibility about the overall scope of this 
“round”, and some opportunity for countries to seek to either broaden it further or to 
strain it, still remains.    re
   
5.3  THE GENERAL STRATEGY 
 
5.3.1  Decide Position on Preferred Scope for New Negotiations and Broad 
Objectives for Wording of the Launching Declaration 
This step provides a basis for participation in the Doha process which has now already 
taken place.  In deciding that it was in their interests to acquiesce to a broader set of 
negotiations than they would choose themselves, DCs clearly sought to make that 
decision conditional on firm DME commitments for full and timely implementation of 
their Uruguay Round Agreement obligations, and much stronger wording on technical 
and financial assistance obligations.  In the SPS area, for example, DCs seem to have 
been able to wring a promise, in principle, to considerable new technical assistance in the 
area of food control system implementation.  LDCs, including Bangladesh, achieved the 
inclusion of considerable wording referring to their special needs, and ministers’ 
intention that they receive particularly favourable treatment in the negotiations. 
 
5.3.2  Seek Actively to Join and Build DC Negotiating Alliances. 
There is a clear cost involved in this.  It can be a very time-consuming process, and 
involve protracted and difficult negotiations about the group’s position even before 
getting to Geneva.  However, the major players will want to deal with representative 
groupings, on both DC issues broadly and LDC issues more narrowly, and once an 
agreement is reached with such a grouping it will be very difficult for other individual 
countries to ask for something different.  The best (perhaps only) way to influence the 
outcome is to be part of the group to begin with, and work from within to shape that 
group’s negotiating position. 
 
5.4  THE STRATEGY IN AGRICULTURE SPECIFICALLY 
   
5.4.1  Prioritize and Place Relative Values on Negotiation Goals as much as 
Possible. 
For example, a priority ranking of some of the goals identified in 5.2.1 above may yield 
the following: 
1.  Concessions in the market access area (e.g., all DME tariffs and quotas 
on LDC products eliminated). 
2.  Special safeguard (SSG) or equivalent made broadly available to 
LDCs or DCs for sensitive commodities. 
3.  Elimination of export subsidies. 
4.  Major reduction in DME domestic support levels. 
5.  Expanded scope for agricultural development spending (via a bigger 
‘development box’ or a higher de minimis. 
 
5.4.2  Identify Which of These May Not Require the Expenditure of LDC 
“Negotiating Capital” 
For example, it may be reasonable to expect that DMEs may agree to TRQ reform, a 
certain amount of AMS reduction and to export subsidy elimination solely due to 
pressure from within their own ranks.  This may take care of  issue 3 above.  Achieving 
even more significant reductions in DME domestic support levels, the SSG or equivalent 
WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Issues and Options for Bangladesh  21
 CPD Occasional Paper Series 15 
concept, and the possible expansion of the “development box” or equivalent, are all DC 
issues broadly.  It is unlikely that the LDC group collectively, much less individual LDCs 
acting alone, will be able to have much influence on the outcomes on these issues. 
Hence, it is probably better to leave the negotiation in this area to the broader DC 
groupings.  Such a strategy would allow Bangladesh and other LDCs to focus most of 
their energies on pushing for the specifically LDC issues—such as item 1. in the above 
illustrative short list. 
 
5.4.3   Enter the Negotiations with Already Identified “Fall Back” and “Bottom 
Line” Positions on the Various Issues in Which Engaged. 
This requires a lot of prior work, especially if such things have to be hammered out 
among a group of countries.   However, it is important for negotiators to anticipate 
counter-offers and to know exactly what they want and what they would be prepared to 
accept.  For example, the issue of DMEs providing tariff-free access for goods from 
LDCs may appear to be rather straightforward and simple to deal with.  Relative to most 
other issues it probably is.  But even here, it can be anticipated that some DMEs will 
demand to have certain product exceptions, or may suggest that it applies only to primary 
agricultural products.  Some DMEs, even if they accept the concept in principle, may 
suggest a long phase-in period.  Others may respond that they are not willing to reduce 
tariffs to zero for LDCs, but would be prepared to entertain a new “GSP for LDCs” in 
which all tariffs would be set and bound at, say, 50 percent of their MFN level.  This is 
really quite different, because it would serve to preserve relative levels of tariff 
escalation, whereas reducing tariffs to zero automatically eliminates escalation. It might 
be anticipated that DMEs, even if they are willing to grant this preferential treatment to 
LDCs, will be worried about the possibility of goods from other countries being 
channeled through LDCs, and may demand more severe “rules of origin”.   
 
In general, what is “offered” will almost certainly fall short of what is “requested”, and 
even a simple issue like this can quickly become complicated.  The LDCs, as 
demandeurs, will need to have thought through well what their responses will be to such 
possible “waterings down” of what is requested, and what, at the end of the day, they are 
willing to live with.  
 
5.4.4   Come to the Table With Specific Proposals. 
Closely related to the last point is the need for all participants in negotiations to provide 
their own specifics, including draft text for an agreement, in areas where they are the 
demandeurs.  Take, for example, the concept of a bigger “development box”, specifying 
measures which would be subject to reduction (“non-exempt”; included in the AMS 
calculation) for DMEs but not for DCs.  In the Uruguay Round Agreement, this box is 
quite small, and is identified in Article 6.2.  Proponents of an expanded “development 
box” must go beyond the general to indicate how they would see it addressed in revised 
text (e.g., an expansion of Article 6.2, or a new Annex) and, more importantly, precisely 
which kinds of programs it would contain.  On the latter point, a typology of programs 
based solely on the programs’ objectives is likely to be more difficult to ‘sell’ than a set 
of criteria dealing with program characteristics (the present Annex 2 model).  The 
important thing is for DCs to take the initiative in drafting text in areas where they would 
like the Agreement on Agriculture to be revised, thus giving DME negotiating partners 
something specific to react to.  If there are going to be any proposals for differential 
treatment for “products of interest” to, or “of particular sensitivity for” DCs then the 
products concerned will have to be the subject of agreement. In such cases, DCs should 
endeavour to find agreement among themselves about the contents of any such list, as a 
first step.  
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6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
1.  Bangladesh and other LDCs can support DCs in general on many issues of 
common interest in the agriculture negotiations; but it may be best to focus their 
own limited negotiating resources and ‘capital’ on the goal of obtaining extra 
S&DT concessions for the LDC group alone.  An obvious example of this is the 
possibility of obtaining duty-free access for LDC goods into DME markets.  In 
addition, there are, the existing LDC provisions, which could be extended, as well 
as many other additional avenues which could be explored.  But it will be up to 
LDCs to identify these in a precise way. 
 
2.  DCs in general have a very valid complaint that the Uruguay Round did not yield 
a balanced outcome in agriculture.  Their market access benefits have to date been 
minimal, while DME policies which create large distortions and instabilities on 
world markets have been allowed to remain.  DCs are wise to insist on a linkage 
between outcomes in the three areas of export subsidies, domestic support and 
market access, and to at least resist significant reductions in their agricultural 
tariff bindings until DMEs show a willingness to really ‘bite the bullet’ in all three 
areas.  Given the relative size of the potential benefits for DCs which analysts 
indicate could be derived from agricultural liberalization, these countries might 
also consider similarly linking progress in other areas of the negotiations to 
progress in agriculture.  Broad DC solidarity will probably be important to this 
particular strategy. 
 
3.  Elimination of export subsidies, elimination of all cases of tariff escalation, 
significant reductions of tariff peaks, some sort of binding of tariff preferences, 
and substantial reductions in trade-distorting (or perhaps all) domestic support 
would all appear to be general DC goals which are realistically attainable at this 
point.  To the extent that such general disciplines are adopted, DCs (and LDCs) 
will have to give careful consideration to the extent they would wish to claim 
exemption for themselves or, alternatively, to how their own programs and 
policies would be affected and what adjustments they themselves would have to 
make. 
 
4.  A very important need of developing countries, which has probably not received 
enough attention in the past, is that of retaining the ability to protect their 
producers against world market instability, using border measures.  This is 
important because they have neither the fiscal resources nor the appropriate 
infrastructure to use direct payment programs to do this, as the DME countries.  
Such capacity should be retained at least as long as any distorting DME subsidies 
and protective measures remain, and arguably even until DCs themselves 
‘graduate’ from the DC category; i.e., until they are rich enough to contemplate 
the direct payments alternative.  Several options exist to address this need, of 
which one is to make some variant on the special agricultural safeguard (SSG) 
generally available to DCs.  At least some DMEs can be expected to resist all 
these options strongly.  Again, it seems likely that broad DC agreement and 
coordination will be needed for success here.  
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5.  From the author’s perspective, few DCs, in contrast, have much to gain from an 
expansion of the “development box”, provided that the existing level of domestic 
support de minimis for DCs is not reduced.  This is because a large number of the 
types of programs which DCs may want to have for food security, rural 
development, diversification, among others, would already fit into the existing 
“green” and “development” boxes, and so be free from reduction commitments.  
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For the rest, there is already the scope for DCs to spend up to 20 percent of the 
value of their agricultural production on “amber” programs without reaching the 
limits.  This is far above the present levels of agricultural development budgets in 
DCs, and what they will conceivably be in the foreseeable future.  Also, DCs have 
an opportunity here to learn from and avoid the mistakes made by many DMEs 
governments in the past of getting into very rich and fiscally-draining farm 
support programs from which it becomes so politically difficult to extricate 
themselves, even when they want to. 
 
6.  As a country with one of the highest levels of agricultural tariff bindings among 
DCs (200 percent for most lines), Bangladesh can expect to be a particular target 
for those DMEs who want to see a significant closing of the gap between bound 
rates and applied rates in DCs generally.  That means that Bangladesh will have to 
pay particular attention to all proposals for tariff reduction modalities as they 
emerge (particularly to the extent that they are designed to reduce tariff peaks).  
Obviously, any suggestion that the starting point for reductions should be recent 
applied rates should be strongly resisted.  A formula approach to tariff reduction 
would probably mean that Bangladesh is less isolated on this issue.  Conceivably, 
on this and other issues the proposals being put forward by other DCs may risk 
causing particular problems for Bangladesh.  In such cases it will be important for 
Bangladesh to work from within DC groupings to influence the detail of such 
proposals before they are tabled in Geneva, so as to minimize the potential 
damage to Bangladesh. 
 
7.  There may be some particular aspects of the agricultural negotiations (e.g. 
definition/scope – jute and jute products), or other negotiations closely related to 
agriculture (e.g., MFA/textiles/apparel, fisheries subsidies) where the interests of 
the Bangladeshi agri-food sector are important enough for it to take an initiative 
either internationally or nationally, or at least to be involved as an interested party 
in national level deliberations.  In many areas, it can be left to other countries to 
take the lead and ‘do the leg work’ on issues of common interest, with 
Bangladesh just indicating its support at the appropriate time.  On the other hand, 
some goals being pursued by a majority of DCs may create particular problems 
for Bangladesh.  It would be important to identify such issues early, and to work 
within the DC grouping to find a formulation of a proposed modality or discipline 
which minimizes the potential downside for Bangladesh.  
 
8.  Bangladesh’s interests in the agricultural negotiations will almost certainly be best 
served by joining and working with LDC and DC coalitions, and influencing their 
proposals from within.  This conclusion is reached despite the considerable extra 
cost in time and effort that such a strategy implies.  Only very large economies 
can expect to have much influence on the final outcome if they work alone.  There 
is definitely strength in numbers in trade negotiations. 
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ANNEX-1 
Summary of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
23  
The negotiations have resulted in four main portions of the Agreement; the Agreement on 
Agriculture itself; the concessions and commitments Members are to undertake on market 
access, domestic support and export subsidies; the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures; and the Ministerial Decision concerning Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing 
Developing countries.  
Overall, the results of the negotiations provide a framework for the long-term reform of 
agricultural trade and domestic policies over the years to come. It makes a decisive move 
towards the objective of increased market orientation in agricultural trade. The rules 
governing agricultural trade are strengthened which will lead to improved predictability and 
stability for importing and exporting countries alike.  
The agricultural package also addresses many other issues of vital economic and political 
importance to many Members. These include provisions that encourage the use of less trade-
distorting domestic support policies to maintain the rural economy, that allow actions to be 
taken to ease any adjustment burden, and also the introduction of tightly prescribed 
provisions that allow some flexibility in the implementation of commitments. Specific 
concerns of developing countries have been addressed including the concerns of net-food 
importing countries and least-developed countries.  
The agricultural package provides for commitments in the area of market access, domestic 
support and export competition. The text of the Agricultural Agreement is mirrored in the 
GATT Schedules of legal commitments relating to individual countries (see above).  
In the area of market access, non-tariff border measures are replaced by tariffs that provide 
substantially the same level of protection. Tariffs resulting from this "tariffication" process, 
as well as other tariffs on agricultural products, are to be reduced by an average 36 per cent in 
the case of developed countries and 24 per cent in the case of developing countries, with 
minimum reductions for each tariff line being required. Reductions are to be undertaken over 
six years in the case of developed countries and over ten years in the case of developing 
countries. Least-developed countries are not required to reduce their tariffs.  
The tariffication package also provides for the maintenance of current access opportunities 
and the establishment of minimum access tariff quotas (at reduced-tariff rates) where current 
access is less than 3 per cent of domestic consumption. These minimum access tariff quotas 
are to be expanded to 5 per cent over the implementation period. In the case of "tariffied" 
products "special safeguard" provisions will allow additional duties to be applied in case 
shipments at prices denominated in domestic currencies below a certain reference level or in 
case of a surge of imports. The trigger in the safeguard for import surges depends on the 
"import penetration" currently existing in the market, i.e. where imports currently make up a 
large proportion of consumption, the import surge required to trigger the special safeguard 
action is lower.  
Domestic support measures that have, at most, a minimal impact on trade ("green box" 
policies) are excluded from reduction commitments. Such policies include general 
government services, for example in the areas of research, disease control, infrastructure and 
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food security. It also includes direct payments to producers, for example certain forms of 
"decoupled" (from production) income support, structural adjustment assistance, direct 
payments under environmental programmes and under regional assistance programmes. 
In addition to the green box policies, other policies need not be included in the Total 
Aggregate Measurement of Support (Total AMS) reduction commitments. These policies are 
direct payments under production-limiting programmes, certain government assistance 
measures to encourage agricultural and rural development in developing countries and other 
support which makes up only a low proportion (5 per cent in the case of developed countries 
and 10 per cent in the case of developing countries) of the value of production of individual 
products or, in the case of non-product-specific support, the value of total agricultural 
production.  
The Total AMS covers all support provided on either a product-specific or non-product-
specific basis that does not qualify for exemption and is to be reduced by 20 per cent (13.3 
per cent for developing countries with no reduction for least-developed countries) during the 
implementation period.  
Members are required to reduce the value of mainly direct export subsidies to a level 36 per 
cent below the 1986-90 base period level over the six-year implementation period, and the 
quantity of subsidised exports by 21 per cent over the same period. In the case of developing 
countries, the reductions are two-thirds those of developed countries over a ten-year period 
(with no reductions applying to the least-developed countries) and subject to certain 
conditions, there are no commitments on subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing exports 
of agricultural products or internal transport and freight charges on export shipments. Where 
subsidised exports have increased since the 1986-90 base period, 1991-92 may be used, in 
certain circumstances, as the beginning point of reductions although the end-point remains 
that based on the 1986-90 base period level. The Agreement on Agriculture provides for 
some limited flexibility between years in terms of export subsidy reduction commitments and 
contains provisions aimed at preventing the circumvention of the export subsidy 
commitments and sets out criteria for food aid donations and the use of export credits.  
"Peace" provisions within the agreement include: an understanding that certain actions 
available under the Subsidies Agreement will not be applied with respect to green box 
policies and domestic support and export subsidies maintained in conformity with 
commitments; an understanding that "due restraint" will be used in the application of 
countervailing duty rights under the General Agreement; and setting out limits in terms of the 
applicability of nullification or impairment actions. These peace provisions will apply for a 
period of 9 years.  
The agreement sets up a committee that will monitor the implementation of commitments, 
and also monitor the follow-up to the Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible 
Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing 
Developing Countries.  
The package is conceived as part of a continuing process with the long-term objective of 
securing substantial progressive reductions in support and protection. In this light, it calls for 
further negotiations in the fifth year of implementation which, along with an assessment of 
the first five years, would take into account non-trade concerns, special and differential 
treatment for developing countries, the objective to establish a fair and market-oriented 
agricultural trading system and other concerns and objectives noted in the preamble to the 
agreement.  
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